Question Two. Whether the Act of Penitence Required for Deletion of Mortal Sin is an Act of some Virtue

76. Whether the act of penitence required for deletion of mortal sin is an act of some virtue.

77. That it is not:

Because “we are not praised for passions,” Ethics 2.4.1105b31-32, and an act of the virtues is praiseworthy, from the same text [1106a1-2]. But to be penitent is a kind of passion, just as is also the punishment that it includes.

78. Again, an act of virtue is voluntary, because it is an act of choice, from Ethics 2.5.1106b36-1107a2; but penitence is involuntary, for nothing is a penalty save what is against one’s will; and then as before [n.77, cf. n.56].

79. Again, the virtues would have been present in the state of innocence, and they will remain in the fatherland, because nature will remain perfect and it would then have been perfect, whose these virtues are. But in the state of innocence there was no penitence, nor will there be in the fatherland, because neither will there be any evil there for which voluntary punishment may be due;     therefore etc     .

80. Again, if to be penitent were an act of virtue, it would not have been a virtue of anything other than the will (as is plain by induction); but it is not any ‘willing’, because it is in respect of evil, nor is it any un-willing save the un-willing that is ‘not willing to have sinned’. But this is not an act of virtue because neither is it an act of choice, for choice does not regard what is impossible, and that the past had not been past is impossible even for God, from Ethics 6.2.1139b10-11: “From God is taken this alone, to make undone what has been done.”

81. Again, it would be an act either of acquired or of infused virtue. Not in the first way because acquired virtue and its act can remain along with mortal sin, but an act of a virtue of penitence cannot, because it destroys mortal sin. Nor is it an act of infused virtue; this is plain by induction about faith, hope, and charity, and also by common proof, because infused virtue and its act have God immediately for object - not so this act, namely of being penitent [sc. which has sin for object, n.62];     therefore etc     .

82. The opposite is plain from the Master in the text [Lombard, Sent. IV d.14 ch.1 n.2].

I. To the Question

83. In this question it is necessary first to see how ‘to be penitent’ could be an act of virtue, and this in any of the four ways that were set down in the preceding question in article three [n.62], and an act of what virtue; second to see whether any of these acts is required as an act of virtue. And therefore the treatment in both articles must be about all four indifferently, because one only gets from the preceding solution that any of them may suffice.

A. About ‘To be Penitent’ as an Act of Virtue

84. The first of these two articles has four parts, according to the four ideas of penitence touched on above about penitence [n.62].

1. According to the First Signification, which is ‘To Avenge Sin’

85. According to the first signification [n.62], the first conclusion is this: to be penitent can be the mean of an act of virtue for this purpose [sc. to avenge a sin], because it can be an act conform to right reason or to rectitude.

86. The proof of this is that according to right reason any legislator avenges transgressions of law; hence the Philosopher in Ethics 10.11.1179b34-81b79b23, after the teaching about the vices and virtues, at once introduces positive law as avenger of vices and rewarder of virtues. But if the legislator avenges by right reason, his minister executes it by right reason, because rectitude in an act of a subordinate universally comes from its conformity with the agent it ministers to. Therefore, according to right reason someone can, as minister of the legislator, avenge sin committed against the law, and avenge it on him on whom he has received commission to take vengeance, for otherwise he would not be subordinate minister.

87. But each of us has received commission to be minister of God in enforcing his law on ourselves for sins committed, and ‘to be penitent’ in the first way states taking vengeance on oneself. For ‘to hold’, when a dative expressing for whom it is held is not added, signifies that it is held for oneself (this is plain from common speechFor instance, to say ‘I hold it’ referring to some object one possesses, means in effect ‘I hold it for myself’. If, however, one is holding it for someone, as in safekeeping, one would say ‘I hold it for you’. ¹⁰). Therefore God, although he punish the sinner, is not said to be penitent, because he inflicts the penalty not on himself but on another. But ‘inflicting a penalty on oneself’ is called holding a penalty, that is, holding a penalty for oneself by applying it to oneself.

88. As to this conclusion, then, I do not say that ‘to be penitent’ in the first way is always an act of virtue, that is, elicited by virtue, but it is of virtue, that is, of a nature to be elicited by virtue or to generate virtue, because it is conform to right reason; and in this lies the goodness of a human moral act. But, as far as concerns the per se idea of moral goodness, it is accidental that it be generated by virtue or generate virtue, as was said in Ord. III d.9 n.12 [also d.33 nn.43-45].

89. The second conclusion is which virtue, according to the first signification of this word [n.62], this act of being penitent belongs to.

90. To solve this one needs to know that ‘to be penitent’ requires, according to this understanding, a distinct prior knowledge of that about which one is penitent. Here I say that the following things are disposed in order: (1) to command the coming together of the partial proximate causes of sadness; (2) and the conjunction of these partial causes that are the proximate effect of the command; (3) and there follows further the remote effect of this command, namely the sadness itself; (4) next contentment in the sadness can follow, which is an act of will having sadness for object; (5) and finally joy in the sadness, according to the saying of Augustine, “Let the sinner grieve over his sin and rejoice in his grief” [n.51].

91. The distinction between these is plain: the distinction, indeed, of the first one, namely the command, from the proximate cause of sadness, as of the principal and remote cause from the proximate and second cause; the distinction of the second one from the third, as of the cause from the effect and of the action from the passion; and the third one from the fourth, as of the object from the action; the fourth one from the fifth, as of the object from the passion that is desirous of this object.

92. I say,     therefore , that nothing in all these five is per se ‘to avenge’ save the first of them, namely the imperative willing itself (the proof is that for an inferior and a superior avenger, or at least for anyone immediately avenging the same sin under the same idea and the same circumstances of avenging, there can be an act of avenging of the same idea). But to take vengeance on oneself and on another, according to right reason in both cases, cannot uniformly be any of these besides the first; therefore etc     .

93. This could be proved a posteriori, because the actions pertaining to the second stage [n.90] can come from as many indeterminate causes as you like, but justly avenging cannot. But this, without arguing in a circle, will be shown immediately a priori.

94. Let it be sufficient, then, to say here that it is possible to find some act that is prior to the proximate causes of sadness and that brings them together, as was made clear in the last article of the preceding question [nn.53-54]; and consequently this act precedes the sadness, and thereby precedes the contentment and much more the joy in the sadness [n.90]. That possible first act I call ‘to avenge’ or to inflict a penalty for what has been committed, and as a result we have the distinct idea of what it is ‘to be penitent’ according to the first signification of the word.

95. On this supposition, let this be the third conclusion [nn.85, 89]: ‘to be penitent’ is an act of a special virtue. The proof is that this act is of a nature to have a special object and specific circumstances, or circumstances ordered around an object, that come together in an act as the act is tending rightly to such object, namely the circumstances that are the end and manner and the like.

96. Further, in particular, let there be this conclusion: ‘to be penitent’ is not an act of any intellectual virtue.

97. The fact is immediately plain, because it is an act of appetite as appetite, for it is to command the intellect to consider and the will to detest (as was said in the preceding solution [nn.54-56, 64-69]). This commanding belongs only to appetite and will. For neither can any sensitive power give command to the intellect and to the will and join them together in their acts; nor can the intellect give command to itself and to the will, but the will alone can give command to itself and to the intellect, according to the remark of Augustine [On the Trinity XI ch.9 n.16], “it joins the parent with the offspring,” and this as concerns the intellect. And as concerns the will, the will gives command to itself.

98. This conclusion [n.96] is also plain as follows, that an intellectual virtue says ‘it is true or it is not true’ in matters of speculation or action. It also inclines to acting accordingly, namely to avenging, but not to giving command that one must so act. Avenging, therefore, is an act not of intellectual but of appetitive virtue.

99. Another conclusion follows, that to be penitent does not belong to an appetitive virtue putting things in order for itself, of which sort are temperance and fortitude; therefore to a virtue putting things in order for another, of which sort is justice. This argument holds on the supposition of the famous distinction between appetitive virtues, that all may be reduced to two genera [Ethics, 5.3.1129b31-33].

100. The proof of the antecedent is that someone can exercise the act of avenging according to right reason in the same way on another as on himself. Also, if he do exercise it on himself, he does not exercise it on himself save as on someone else, because he does not exercise it save insofar as taking vengeance on this guilty party is committed to him by the legislator.

101. But it is accidental that he to whom it is committed as to a minister of the judge is this guilty party himself, because he acts on the guilty party in the same way according to the right reason of a minister as if that party were altogether different in person. Therefore the virtue to which this act is of a nature to belong is contained under justice, to the extent that any virtue is called justice that regulates things for another, or as if for another. Nor is it an obstacle that he is, because of this, directed at himself in this act, because he is only directed at himself as at another, namely as a minister of the judge against someone guilty of breaking the law, authority over whom has been committed to him by the judge.

102. A further inquiry: for under justice is contained friendship, speaking of justice in general, because friendship is a virtue toward another, Ethics 8.1.1155a3-31 and 9.4.1166a1-33 - is this act of penitence, then, or punishing an act of friendship?

103. It seems that it is, because an act of reconciling with a friend is friendship, and such this act is.

104. Again, it is a mark of friendship to correct a friend so that he be worthy to be loved (with that excluded which is repugnant to an honest friendship). The avenging here is a correcting of a friend, so that he become worthily lovable;     therefore etc     . The proof of the minor is that if he is only punished so that vengeance be exacted or the avenger be sated, it is cruelty;     therefore avenging is according to right reason only so that he on whom vengeance is taken be corrected; but this is friendship; therefore etc     .

105. There is a confirmation from the Philosopher in Rhetoric 1.10.1369b12-14, who says that reproof differs from punishment strictly taken in this, that reproof is for the sake of the one reproved, namely so that he be amended, but punishment is for the sake of the punisher, so that he be sated. But the second seems to belong altogether to cruelty, and this both in the minister and in the judge, for the minister ought to carry out the sentence for the same end as that for which the judge gave it, because the minister’s end should be the end of the one moving him; and consequently what is of cruelty in one is of cruelty in the other.

106. I reply:The arguments that follow, which reject this Aristotelian-derived idea of punishment as an act of friendship, seem more clever than decisive, and seem also to give to observance of the law qua observance a status more tidy than compelling. For the law would seem, like the Sabbath (Mark 2.27), to be for man and not man for the law, and fulfillment of the law is not observance but love (Romans 13.10). Let the arguments, however, be the judge. ¹¹ ‘to avenge’, even when it is an ordered act, is not an act of friendship toward him on whom vengeance is taken, because vengeance properly regards the penalty that, according to law, corresponds to the fault committed, even if reproof of the one punished not accompany it. Hence too is just vengeance sometimes done by extermination of the culprit, where it is plain it is not done by reproving him. Nor yet is it cruelty, as the second objection argues [n.104], because the proximate end of it is conservation of the law, and the further end is what the end of the law is. But the end of the positive law passed by man is not the legislator himself or his good, but the common good; therefore the law and its observance are for the sake of that end. And so vengeance insofar as it is for that end is more reasonable than if it were for the private good of a public person.

107. Now in the issue at hand it could similarly be said that the divine Law is for the common good of men, to whom also has been given punishment of anyone sinning against the Law, and this latter [sc. punishment] is for the sake of observance of the Law, and further for the sake of the common good of those to whom the Law has been given. But at last it is for the sake of the Legislator himself, and so is it here for this reason; and it is not so as to law passed by man, because the good of the Legislator in the former case is simply better than the good of the community, but not so in the latter case.

108. Now an act of friendship that commanded some punishment of a loved one as loved would precisely command it only for correction of the loved one; and though this might be the way of correcting him, yet if there were another way of more easily correcting him toward friendship as friendship, it would rather command the other way.

109. Hereby to the first objection [n.103] I say that, if someone be reconciled by penitence to God, yet God does not principally take vengeance on him to reconcile him to himself (calling ‘reconciliation’ his being brought back to the old friendship), but so that the one reconciled be held immune from the penalty due to sin, since the penalty has now been paid, which the avenger (because of its aforesaid correspondence with the fault committed) per se required to be paid according to law.

110. To the second objection [n.105] I say similarly that vengeance is not properly for the correction of the one punished, although that correction sometimes follow. But it is per se for setting the fault in order through the penalty, and so that the punitive law against which transgression was made be observed. And when it is said that this belongs to cruelty, plainly it does not, because the further good is the common good; but it would be cruel if a stand were made in an end other than the common end, or than the ultimate end.

111. As to the confirmation from the Rhetoric [n.105] I say that he who corrects does it for the sake of the one reproved, but an avenger does so not per se for the sake of the one reproved or for the sake of himself, but for the sake of the law, and this further for the sake of the common good - and then for the sake of himself if he himself is the end of the law, as it is in the issue at hand.

112. There is this act of punitive justice, then, which is distinguished from commutative justice, and also from friendship. And perhaps this act is nobler than any act of justice in common (excepting the act of giving reward), for it is proper to the legislator and fits no one else, save by commission from the judge as to his deputy.

113. Now other acts (of exchange and of friendship and the like) can regularly belong to any person, but an act that is proper to a more excellent person is, ceteris paribus, more excellent. An act of rewarding, however, is more excellent still because, along with this excellence common to each (namely that the rewarding belongs to a prince alone), it has extremes that are each more noble, namely the merit for which it is done, and the reward that is conferred, and the deserving person on whom it is conferred - which excel the penalty, fault, and guilty person on whom the penalty is inflicted.

114. Another conclusion is this, that the act is an act of the will, whose job it is to give command to intellect and will, and this by a command belonging to the irascible power, or some power having in itself something similar to irascible virtue. For just as the irascible power in the sense faculty avenges in its own way, so the power that commands vengeance in the intellective part has something similar to the irascible power; but in the intellective part it now belongs only to the will.

115. From this there could be a doubt about the relation of this virtue to charity; for from the fact that by its own act it commands an act of charity, it seems to be superior to charity.

116. Yet the opposite is manifest, because the object per se of charity is God under his most noble objective idea, and the proper object of this virtue is a bad to be avenged or a culprit on whom vengeance should be taken.

117. From this is it plain that penitence not only is not a theological virtue, as was argued before [n.81], but that neither is it the simply most noble virtue among those virtues that concern a created object.

118. To the second objection [n.104], about the use of virtue, I say that the will can use itself circularly, as it were, according to diverse habits: from an act of love for God in himself, which is an act of charity, it can command an act of will of avenging sin, and conversely from an act commanding vengeance it can command an act of love for God in himself, on which there follows an un-willing or displeasure about some sin committed, and thus sadness about this sin. Therefore charity can use an act of penitence, and also an act of any virtue in the will or in the intellect. And penitence can use charity and any virtue, in the intellect and in the will, that can be the principle of a consideration or an un-willing of an object about which it wills to cause sadness.

119. I say, therefore, that the virtue to which, from its object, command more belongs is better simply than another virtue; but to charity, from its object, namely the ultimate end, it belongs to use any other virtue rather than conversely, just as always in ordered arts and powers what has a higher end regularly uses inferior ones.

120. So does it appear about the first act of being penitent, or about the first signification of this word ‘to be penitent’ [n.62]: what it is - that it is an imperative willing; and of what it is the effect - that it is the effect of sadness; through what things as through what instruments - that it is through the proximate causes of sadness, namely actual knowledge and actual un-willing of some object; and about what object - that it is about sin committed; and by whom - that it is by a minister having from the legislator a commission for punishing; and for the sake of what end - that it is for the sake of observance of the law and further for the sake of the common good; and thereby that it can be the act of a special virtue - that it is of a certain special justice; and of what object - that it is of the will; and what comparison it has with the acquired and infused theological virtues.

2. According to the Remaining Three Significations, which are: To Detest Sin, to Accept Penalty Gladly, to Suffer Penalty Patiently

121. About the second signification of this word that ‘to be penitent’ is, about what of course it is to detest sin committed or to be displeased over sin committed - I say that this can be an act of virtue.

122. The proof is as before [n.85], that it can be an act of choice in agreement with right reason; for just as right reason dictates that one should be pleased with the honorable good, so it dictates that one should be displeased with the dishonorable bad.

123. From this is plain a second conclusion, namely of which virtue it can be the act, that it is not of some special virtue but of any virtue of appetite. For any virtue whatever inclines toward being pleased with the honorable good; any virtue also inclines to detesting the dishonorable bad (as chastity in respect of something disordered against chastity inclines to displeasure, humility in respect of an inordinate act of pride, and so on of the rest). However, whatever inclines toward such displeasure is an appetitive virtue, because nothing is a principle of hating or loving unless it is an appetitive virtue.

124. From this is plain that detestation of sin would be badly posited to be an act of penitence as virtue, speaking of penitence as virtue in the first way, as it is a species of justice [n.62]; because this act is much more general than what that could be which is an act proper to penitence-as-justice elicited by it.

125. About the third one, which is ‘to accept gladly a punishment inflicted for sin committed’, I say that this act can be an act of virtue because it is in agreement with right reason; and secondly I say it can be an act of many virtues, each of which however is an appetitive virtue; because whatever can be a principle of accepting some object, can be a principle of accepting another object in its order to it. And different objects can be accepted through diverse virtues, in an ordering to which a penalty inflicted for sin could be accepted; for if God is loved out of charity, a penalty can be accepted out of charity insofar as it leads back to divine friendship. But if God were, out of the virtue of hope, desired as a good for me, a penalty would, out of the virtue of hope, be accepted as ordering me to this attainable reward. If the loss of eternal life is, out of the virtue of fear, guarded against, a penalty can, out of this fear, be accepted as excluding the loss. If one loves purity and innocence for oneself out of honorable love for oneself, one can accept, out of that love, the penalty that pays the guilt that was present.

126. About the fourth one, namely to bear patiently a penalty inflicted, it is plain that it can be an act of virtue, and of a special virtue, because of an act of patience.

B. Whether Being Penitent as an Act of Virtue is Required for Deletion of Sin

127. About the second main point [n.83], namely whether ‘to be penitent’, as an act of virtue, is required for deletion of sin, I say not as an act of one determinate virtue; and, second, not as an act of any virtue, of this or that sort indifferently; and third, if as an act with the circumstances present simply perfectly, is it sufficient as formed or as unformed?

1. For Deletion of Sin ‘To be Penitent’ is not Required as an Act of any Determinate Virtue

128. The first is plain from what was aid, that ‘to be penitent’ suffices according to any of the four significations stated before - as is proved by the authority of Ezekiel 18.21-22, “In the hour the sinner laments, he will be saved” [in Gratian Decretum p.1 d.50 ch.14, Lombard Sent. d.17 ch.1 n.4, from Caesarius of Arles, sermon 70 n.2: “In the day the sinner will be converted, all his iniquities will be given over to oblivion”]. The first act and two others do not necessarily belong to the same determinate virtue, but the first to justice, the last to patience, the two in the middle to any appetitive virtue.

2. For the Deletion of Sin an Act as it is First Generative of Virtue can Suffice

129. I prove the second [n.127], that an act equally perfect as to all moral circumstances is equally accepted by God for deletion of sin; but it is possible for an act equally perfect as to all circumstances to be had without generated virtue, just as it is possible for it to be had now with generated virtue. For there can be, in accord with a perfect dictate of intellect about any doable thing, a perfect choice, conditioned by all the circumstances, that is first generative of the virtue; and consequently, a right act perfectly circumstanced (which is required for deletion of sin), does not have to be an act of virtue as coming from a virtue now inwardly present, but it can come from an act of virtue as this act is first generative of the virtue.

3. Whether for Deletion of Sin is Required a Human Act that is Unformed or Formed

130. About the third [n.127] I say that the requirement of some human act for deletion of sin can be understood in two ways: either as a disposition preceding it or as one concomitant with it.

131. In the first way an unformed act is sufficient; indeed it is always unformed, because a disposition previous to deletion of sin is always without the grace and charity by whose inherence and inclination to act alone is an act said to be formed.

132. In the second way [n.130] I say that a formed act is required, because in the instant in which sin is deleted charity is present, and consequently, if an act as concomitant is required, a formed act is required.

133. To understand this one must note that when a sinner is in a state of sin (in the way stated in the preceding question, the first article, that sin remains after the act [nn.28-34]), he is able, using his natural powers with their common influence, to reflect on the sin committed as it is offensive to God, and contrary to the Divine Law, and turning away from God, and impeding reward, and inducing punishment, and under many such ideas. The will too can, under any of these ideas, detest the sin thus considered, and its motion can be continued and intensified before infusion of grace.

134. This detesting can also be conditioned fully with its due moral circumstances. For it is not likely to be necessary that any act concerning the committed sin be, because of the remaining sin within, defective in any moral circumstance. Thw whole movement here is called attrition, and it is a disposition, or a merit by congruity,Merit by congruity is not a merit that deserves deletion of sin (the only such merit is Christ’s, not the sinner’s). It is the congruity that if the sinner does what he can (namely to be sad with natural sadness for sin committed), then God does what he can (namely forgive sin and infuse supernatural grace). ¹² for the deletion of mortal sin, which deletion follows at the last moment of the time during which the attrition endured.

135. And it is not certain whether God wanted such attrition, if it not be perfectly morally conditioned, to be a disposition for justification. At any rate, if there is some circumstance not conditioned in proper order, such attrition is not a disposition for justice, because it is actually then offensive. But if it is lacking some due circumstance only because of inconsideration or omission by the will as to that circumstance, then there is doubt whether it be a sufficient disposition for justice.

136. However, if the attrition has all the circumstances in the class of morals perfectly, the disposition does seem to be an altogether sufficient disposition for acquiring justice at the term of the attrition - at the term, I say, which God has prefixed should be the term of the motion of the attrition that he wants to be continued up to that point. For either one must say that a sinner is justified without any disposition on his part that is sufficient by congruity (and it is consequently difficult to save the fact that there is with God no acceptance of persons, as was said in Ord. II d.7 n.47ff. [Rep IVA d.7 qq.13]).If there is no disposition at all on the part of a sinner for which God, by congruity, gives charity and deletes sin, then that this sinner receives charity and that other does not bears no relation to any difference in the sinner but is arbitrary on God’s part, so that God engages in acceptance of persons, choosing this one and not that one regardless of presence or absence of disposition. ¹³ Or that there can be no disposition more sufficient for this justification than this attrition perfectly circumstanced in the class of morals, and that then in the final instant (or in some instant up to which God has determined the attrition should last so as to be a merit by congruity for justification), grace is infused and sin is then simply destroyed.

137. And if the movement against sin remain the same in being of nature and of morals as it was before, the same motion that was attrition before becomes, in that instant, contrition as well, because in that instant it becomes concomitant with grace and so is a formed act, because it has charity along with it, which is the form of the act as we are here speaking of it.

138. One must, however, distinguish momentsStrictly ‘signs’, but these signs are as it were distinct moments of understanding, succeeding each other progressively not in time but in completeness of analysis. ¹⁴ of nature there: between the act as it is the sort of thing it is in being of nature and of morals, and between charity, and between the act as it is formed - because in the first moment of nature an act of the above sort is there; in the second there is charity; in the third an act formed by a charity now inclining inherently from within. And in this way does attrition become contrition without any real change in the act itself.

139. To the contrary: therefore guilt is not destroyed by contrition, because there is only contrition in the third moment of nature, and guilt is destroyed in the second moment; nor even is it destroyed by this contrition as by merit, because it follows the deletion.

140. One can say, therefore, that God disposes to give, through attrition over time (as through a merit by congruity), at some instant grace; and he justifies for that attrition, as for a merit, in the way it is the merit of justification. And although the act concerning the sin not be continued the same as before in genus of nature and morals, yet in that instant grace would be infused, because now sufficient merit by congruity has preceded. For let it be that in the final instant the intellect and will cease from the act just done by turning themselves to some other inappropriate act, why will he not be justified in that final instant as someone else will be who in that instant has the act he had before? For he who has the act in that last instant is not justified in that last instant by that sort of act, but by the act as it has gone before in time, and in this way did the former have that act.

141. And one would, according to this, say that it is not necessary for deletion of sin that some act of penitence is concomitant, neither formed nor not formed, but only that an unformed act of penitence precedes in time up to that instant.

142. But what if in that or some other moment he put an obstacle in the way? For just as he can have an inappropriate act then, so can he have an opposite one.

143. One would say that he cannot put an obstacle in the way, because he has already merited that in that instant grace be given to him.

144. But this is nothing, for although one could not put an obstacle in they way in the instant of being rewarded after merit by congruity, namely one cannot demerit in the instant of death (for then impeccability must be rendered for his merit), yet he who has merited by congruity can put an obstacle in the way in the instant in which he would receive the term of merit if there were no obstacle; and just as in the term of merit by congruity he is able not to have that which he did not merit (because he puts an obstacle in the way), so it is likely that unless he continue in that instant an act in the class of morals of like sort, he will not have that for which such an act by congruity meritoriously disposes him.

145. And therefore the first way [n.138] seems more reasonable, namely that by an unformed act of penitence but one that is fully or half fully circumstanced in the class of morals, sin is deleted as by preceding disposition and merit by congruity. And by an act of penitence that is formed and is called ‘contrition’ sin is deleted as by concomitant act [nn.130-132].

146. And when it is argued that contrition as contrition follows deletion of sin [n.139], I reply: the act that is contrition is, in the same instant of time, prior in nature to the deletion, even though as contrition, that is, as formed, it follow the deletion of sin in order of nature. And thus should it be conceded, in the sense of division, that by the act that is contrition sin is destroyed as by an altogether proximate disposition; nor is it unacceptable, rather is it acceptable, that the proximate disposition exist at the same time as the form for which it is the disposition.

147. If a question be asked about the four acts above stated [nn.62; 57, 120-126], by comparing them with each other as to which is simply a disposition more fitting for deletion of sin - I reply: the more an act is elicited from more virtues and from virtues more perfect, the more is that act better; therefore if the first act be elicited by justice alone, mediately or immediately, and if the second act and the third be elicited by a more perfect virtue, that is, by charity, it is plain that the second or third is more excellent than the first. The same way of understanding must be taken about the fourth; for it is simply most imperfect, both because it has less of the idea of the voluntary and because it is from a less perfect virtue [sc. patience].

148. But if justice, when commanding an act in the first way, be moved to give its command by an act of charity, as is above said to be possible [n.120], then the first act has a double goodness: both from the justice proximately commanding the act and from the charity remotely commanding the act. Similarly, if justice in the first way command the use of charity as proximate cause with respect to sadness, the act of charity is thereby more perfect (because coming from two virtues) than if it come from one alone.

149. But if it be asked which of these acts is more efficacious with respect to the inhering of sadness, I reply: the last two presuppose a sadness already inherent. And the other two can be mutually excellent in inducing sadness. For sometimes, from love or contemplation of God, there is at once present a certain detestation of sin, and there follows a very strong sadness when still no act of justice with respect to sadness is in place. And sometimes the first act of justice is present and intense in itself, and yet the proximate causes (namely the intellect in considering and the will in detesting) are not efficaciously moved by command of justice, perhaps because they lack the habits that would be the principles of perfection in their acts. And although these are sometimes moved, sadness does not follow, because, although this could be for many causes, it is sometimes for this cause, that just as the intellect is conformed in us to the sense part, so too the intellective appetite, as far as concerns being easily delighted or saddened, is conformed to the sense appetite. Therefore, his will is not easily saddened whose sense appetite is not of a nature to be saddened or grieved.

150. And from this follows that there is someone who has a very great act of penitence in the first way and yet no or little effect; and some others, without any act of penitence in the first way, have an effect very great, an effect of the same idea as that which is of a nature to be the effect of penitence. And the fact that the effect is greater or lesser is indeed an excellence in the order of deletion of sin. But greater simply is the excellence of act over act, on which acts follows the sadness on this side and on that, because the act causative of sadness destroys sin meritoriously more than does the sadness itself.

II. To the Initial Arguments

151. To the first initial argument [n.77] I say that although sadness is a passion, yet to command it is an act; and, as was said before [nn.52-53], to be sad is not an act of the virtue of penitence, however one takes penitence; but sadness is the remote effect of the virtue of penitence taken in the first way, and it is the proximate effect of the cause immediate to that very sadness.

152. As to the second [n.78], it was said in the preceding question how a penalty can be voluntary according to the affection of justice [n.56]; and let it be that the penalty were involuntary, it does not follow that the act elicited by the will not be voluntary.

153. As to the third [n.79], a twofold response can be made:

In one way that [penitence comes] from the fact virtue in us supplies for a natural deficiency in us; hence some do not posit moral virtues in the angels, and [moral virtues] in the state of innocence would not have been such in nature as they are now; nor would there then have been need to have all the virtues that there is need of now. And this holds especially of the virtues that do not have good for object but bad, as penitence does, because in the state if innocence that bad would not have existed, just as neither would there have been patience then, nor matter for patience.

154. It can be said alternatively that penitence is a habit inclining to avenging easily a guilty party; and that this party is oneself is the material for it, because the formal idea of the virtue would be the same if it were committed to oneself to take vengeance on some other guilty party. And the blessed and innocent can have a habit for promptly taking vengeance on another guilty party; therefore on themselves too, provided however a fault were present. And thus can it be conceded that in the state of innocence and in beatitude penitence would remain a justice-virtue; and no wonder since in God there remains vindictive justice, although not against himself, because he cannot be guilty.

155. To the final one [n.81, the fifth]No response is given by Scotus to the fourth argument [n.80], but a response can be constructed from what he says in answer to the question of what remains after an act of sin to stain the sinner. For he says there that such a stain can be the object of a choice, because it can be removed by an act of penitence that is chosen [nn.34-43]. ¹⁵ I say that penitence is not a theological virtue, but concerns a created object.

156. And when argument is made that it cannot be unformed, I deny it; indeed, from many acts of justly avenging oneself as culprit, a habit can be acquired that may abide with mortal sin; and it could be acquired before deletion of mortal sin, save perhaps that the Lord justifies before sufficient acts could be obtained for generating penitence.

157. And when proof is given first that it destroys sin, so it does not stand along with sin, I reply that a virtue does not destroy sin, even meritoriously, but the act does that is of a nature to be an act of the virtue, whether it be elicited by the virtue or not but is generative of it; and along with this act can [sin] very well stand, indeed it necessarily does so, since the act is unformed; and consequently the habit of it, if it is present, will be unformed.

158. And if argument to the contrary is made through authorities, one of which is Augustine On Patience ch.23 n.20, “without charity in us there cannot be true penitence,”Augustine’s text reads ‘patience’ for ‘penitence’, but ‘penitence’ is given in the citation of it by Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 33 q.3, and Lombard, Sent. d.15 ch.7 n.1. ¹⁶ and another of which is [Ps.]-Augustine On True and False Penitence ch.17 n.33, “Since fruitful penitence is a work of God, he can inspire it whenever his mercy wishes,” and in the same place [ch.9 n.24], he considers it unacceptable that someone obtain pardon without the love of God, and unacceptable in the same way that true penitence exist without love of GodPs.-Augustine ibid. “For true penitence makes an effort to lead the penitent to the purity of baptism... Let him know that he remains hard in guilt who laments the ravages of time or the death of a friend, and does not with tears show grief for sin.” ¹⁷ - all these authorities have a single response, that penitence, whether the act or the virtue, is not a true virtue as to attaining the end of penitence without charity. And this is what the second authority says about fruitful penitence. For penitence can, absolutely, arise from man’s natural faculties, but fruitful penitence cannot, that is, penitence bearing fruit; indeed, as fruitful, it exists in the final instant. But the third authority, that without love no one obtains God’s pardon - ‘pardon’ there can be taken not only for mercy but for the end of penitence; and thus do we commonly say that pardon is acquired through penitence, and the pardon is when someone is through grace accepted for God’s mercy or friendship.